
Wednesday, 26-March-2025
Jabic F.
Africa undeniably faces a democratic deficit, and has since the process of decolonisation began, following the Second World War. Universal consensus would say that Africa, nor even any country in the Africa, is as democratic as it could be, or as it should be. Worldwide, there is talk about disintegration of institutions, unrepresentative governmental systems, and the rise of populism and autocracy, to name a few issues. Looking out across the vastness of failed or failing democracies across the globe, two questions immediately arise, which are most acutely felt across Africa, where Nations united by nothing but colonial boundaries have been grappling with these issues, and these questions, for the last sixty-odd years since the majority of them initially gained independence. The first question is, given the focus on styling African Nations’ democratic institutions after those of the west, and their colonisers, is the the right set of targets in the sights of those pursuing Democracy across the Continent? And second question is, given the failure of so many democracies focused attempting to emulate the west, what happens when Africans develop democracy with little or no off-continent influence at all?
In terms of the targets of an ideal democracy, I think back to Julius Nyerere, and his views on Effective African Governance. Nyerere was one of, if not the, greatest statesmen in modern history, developing the Tanganyikan, and later Tanzanian, nations out of there colonial beginnings, coming as close as humanely possible to eradicating tribal, ethnic, and religious disputes in a region of the world marred for decades before and after his time by conflicts circling those very issues, and creating a truly pan-national “Tanzanian” identity in a region whose borders stand as an excellent example of European Colonial “Lines-on-a-map” borders, similar to many across Africa. It is hardly a shock that in Tanzania, he is referred to as Baba wa Taifa, or Father of the Nation. Amongst the pantheon of legendary founders of Post-Second-World-War African Nations being created in the era of Decolonisation, Nyerere stood somewhat alone, as he was not a supporter of pure Western-Style Parliamentary Democracy, and despite his long tenure as President of Tanzania, Nyerere was never, and likely could never be argued to be an Autocratic Dictator. Nyerere stood somewhat unique, in his ideals of a democratic, one-party state, which he believed was particularly and pertinently applicable, necessary, and useful in recently freed colonies, and especially African ones. In his 1961 seminal essay on the topic, the aptly titled “One Party Government” which Nyerere contributed to Transition Magazine, (an early Pan-African Journal, at that time published in Kampala, Uganda) Nyerere outlined not only his vision for the functioning of a democratic one-party state, but also his justification[1]. Quoting Guy Clutton Brock, Nyerere harkened back to an ideal “African democracy,” made up of the areas’ elders, sitting under a tree, talking until they agreed. Nyerere immediately agreed with the obvious counterpoint to this idealistic view of democracy; that sitting under a tree talking until agreement is no longer a system capable of governing the entirety of our complex, and vast modern nations. Yet, Nyerere does not give up on that idea of collaboration to democratic ends and points out an interesting caveat in the Western view of democracy – by far the most recognised and widely accepted view of such – which is that a lack of structured, oppositional resistance to the majority, or to the government, is directly equal to a lack of democracy. However, structured opposition, with a role made up exclusively of resisting the government on all or most issues, does not inherently make a system more democratic, and neither does a single party controlling the operations of government, with spontaneous, free dissidence, debate, and resistance from within the party walls. Nyerere argues that a lack of “automatic” opposition, and the existence of “spontaneous” opposition does not inherently violate the fundamental tenets of democracy, and in developing nations, which seemed at the time (and all the more 65 years later) to be in an existential race against the clock to build their nation economically, socially, and securely. With the looming threat of both the US and the USSR as world superpowers, paired with Nyerere’s outspoken and well-known support for the non-aligned movement (headed by Ghana’s Dr. Kwame Nkrumah), it comes as little surprise that Nyerere saw the infant nations of Africa as in a state of emergency, in a position of weakness, that required internal unity and forward thinking, to strengthen before they could be gobbled up into being vassals – or worse – of some superpower. Nyerere saw the solution to this being a lack of formal opposition, and the resolution of policy issues on an internal, party level, a position which largely still holds in Tanzania to this day. Although most General Elections are seen as somewhat, if not extremely, rigged or at a minimum manipulated in favour of the Ruling Party (CCM, an evolution of Nyerere’s original TANU Party), the internal party politics of CCM are fundamentally democratic, and have a massive level of internal moderation. CCM’s policy of alternating presidents between the Nations’ two major religions keeps religious tensions at bay better than any government policy could, their system of promotion, and internal regulation is more democratic than many nations. I heard it said once, that “If you treat CCM Primaries as the National Elections, Tanzania is one of the most democratic nations in the world.” From the 1960s onwards, as many other young nations across Africa struggled in their early years, falling to Autocracy, Civil War, Genocide, or Military Rule, Tanzania stood strong, stable, and free. Nyerere’s ideals of the stability and effectiveness of a Democratic One-Party-System proved to be accurate. Obviously, Tanzania was no Utopia. Nyerere’s Ujamaa ideology, and several of his other socialist-leaning economic policies did not set Tanzania on an ideal trajectory, as admitted even by Nyerere himself in 1977[2]. However, in a region of Africa marred by Civil Wars and Ethnic Conflicts in Mozambique to its south, and Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC to its west, circled by Genocide in Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire, Autocratic Dictators in Uganda addition to the aforementioned nations, and even Ethnic-based Instability and Violence in Kenya on its Northern Border, Tanzania has remained a relative bastion of calm, largely due to the processes supported by TANU (and later CCM), and the long-term benefits of a stable ruling party, that remains devoid of Autocratic Dictatorship. Since Nyerere’s death, opposition parties have been re-introduced into Tanzania, a feature of the Tanzanian Electoral climate that has been attributed to the changing face of CCM, as although it still holds the keys to the Bunge (Tanzania’s Parliament) and the Presidency, the threat of other parties force CCM leadership and candidates to adapt to the changing political and cultural climate, and prevent it from becoming – as many other solitary ruling parties have across the world – stale, and unrepresentative of the people. This evidences the fact that, as Nyerere wrote in 1961, “whether [an opposition party] does or does not arise depends entirely on the will of the people themselves and makes no difference at all to the freedom of discussion and the equality in freedom which together make democracy.”
Tanzania’s example shows the world something important: what large parts of the world have accepted or defined as the gold standard of Parliamentary Democracy, is not inherently the best option for all nations worldwide. Whether Denmark, or Canada, or Italy’s system is best for them is irrelevant to the point that imposing Western-style “Liberal Democracies” onto African Nations will not always work – in fact historically speaking, it hardly ever does. In what feels to be an obvious, self-evident statement, African Nations require African Solutions. But that raises the second question posed earlier, which is, how much influence should the west (or other global and regional powers) hold over guiding nations to their democratic destinies. Few people would argue that a democratic society is not the idealistic end-goal for every country on earth. It is also un-controversial to argue that Foreign Great Powers (Primarily the US and USSR through the latter half of the 1900s, and the US and China since then) have had a net-negative effect on Democracy in Africa. Notable leaders supported and elected by the people have been overthrown with French, American, Soviet, support. Yet, many people argue that this web of international influence is simply being used for the wrong purposes, rather than that it is wrong in itself. Is western influence helpful, or even necessary? Tanzania provided one example that says no, having developed through its embryotic stages largely without overbearing external influence, thanks in part to their balancing of alliances with the United Kingdom – through the Commonwealth – and with the “Non-Aligned” movement[3]. A further, ongoing example of isolated development is Somaliland.
Somaliland, internationally unrecognized as an Independent State, but which has been under self-rule, and completely out of the control of the Federal Somali Government since the 1990s, has developed its own form of democratic rule, adapted not only to its local specifics, but adaptable to its local needs. The long and arduous International effort to create and upkeep Somalia, arguably the most egregious example of “Lines on a Map” Colonial Borders, has resulted in a complete lack of international political will to recognize any faction of Somalia as an independent state, out of risk of violating Somalia’s sovereignty, or of lending credence, legitimacy, and precedent to other secessionist movements across Somalia, the region, and beyond[4]. Therefore, Somaliland’s development has happened, in a categorically unique way, with little to no outside influence. The Somaliland government self-proclaims that they pursue democratic ideals at some level as a way to prove themselves worthy of recognition, yet despite little movement from the outside world on Somaliland’s Independence, they have continued forward with [mostly] regular elections, several peaceful transitions of power, with four parties being represented by Somalilander Presidents since their de facto independence in 1991. As recently as November 2024, Waddani candidate Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Irro” won the Presidential election in a surprise upset of incumbent Kulmiye candidate Muse Bihi Abdi, followed by a peaceful transition of power between the Fifth and Sixth presidents of Somaliland. Yet Somaliland doesn’t just differ from the west by having clear and respected rule of law for its leaders and their power transitions. Somaliland’s upper Legislative House, the House of Elders (Golaha Guurtida) is made up not of elected representatives, but of representatives from the traditional Somalilander Clans. At first glance, the existence of this very powerful, unelected body screams out “undemocratic”, similar to how Canada and the United Kingdom’s Upper Parliamentary Houses are both unelected, and thus are targets of constant calls for reform or abolishment, to better align with “democratic principles.” However, in the same way that the United Kingdom’s House of Lords illustrates the history and culture that brought into being Democracy in the United Kingdom, the very existence of the Guurti is proof of Somaliland’s Bottom-up development of their democratic, legislative, and political system, which has clearly been designed for and by the people and the Nation it serves. Across Somaliland, and other parts of what is recognized internationally as Somalia, tribal factions have served as a massive danger to any democratically elected government, as any such government inherently faces massive regionalist and factionalist resistance. The existence of the Guurti, then serves as a counter to that, by guaranteeing continued clan influence, even on a democratically elected system. As an unelected body, the Guurti also serves massively to counteract issues that have derailed the democratic systems of much larger nations. Due to regional instability, as well as natural catastrophes such as drought and famine, the body of Clan Elders have extended the term of many presidents, to allow for congruency in leadership to deal with these issues. Although this has been seen as undemocratic, these periods allow for a more effective leadership during times of crisis, which come more frequently in areas like Somaliland, due to their relative ecological fragility in comparison to the climates of Western Democracies. In addition, unlike in other formerly democratic nations, these periods of term extension have ended, every single time, and been followed by an election. In addition, of the six Presidents who have held office in Somaliland, only one has yet successfully pursued and won a re-election campaign (Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal was successfully elected in both 1993 and 1997). Through that lens, it is clear that the rule of law, democratic will, and individuals’ confidence in their ability to influence government is strong in Somaliland. Even western sources such as The Economist have labelled Somaliland as East Africa’s “Strongest Democracy.”[5] The evidence seems to point to the idea that a lack of external intervention is congruent, in at least some situations, with the development of stronger, more free, fairer, Democracies, which are developed by Africans, living in the areas subject to these systems, and which have certain key differences from Western Democracies that necessitate their study and recognition. In terms of the ongoing development of democracy across Africa, a process which has been stopped and started hundreds, if not thousands of times across the continent over the past sixty years, it is fundamental that we realise that systems designed by and for western nations are not the best option and are certainly not the only option. Taking Tanzania and Somaliland as an example, it is clear that, by taking heed of traditional cultural values, of the unique requirements of African Nations, and by guarding African Nations’ and Peoples’ right to self-determination of governance systems, African Leaders and Nations can work to develop and maintain systems of governance that are fair to the people, serve their interest well, and value Democratic Values, as African Leaders and Peoples always have.
[1] Nyerere, Julius. “One Party Government.” Transition, no. 2 (1961): 9–11. https://doi.org/10.2307/2934255.
[2] NYERERE, JULIUS K. “The Arusha Declaration Ten Years After.” The African Review: A Journal of African Politics, Development and International Affairs 7, no. 2 (1977): 1–34. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45341443.
[3] Nyerere, J. K. “The Transition Profile: Julius Nyerere.” Transition, no. 2 (1961): 21–30. https://doi.org/10.2307/2934262.
[4] Cowell, Frederick. “Recognising Secessionist Claims: The Organisation of African Unity and African Union’s Complex Record.” Journal of African Union Studies 2, no. 1/2 (2013): 25–42. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26893804.
[5] T.G. 2017. “Why Somaliland Is East Africa’s Strongest Democracy.” The Economist. November 13, 2017. https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2017/11/13/why-somaliland-is-east-africas-strongest-democracy.
Source Material and Further Reading
- Cowell, Frederick. “Recognising Secessionist Claims: The Organisation of African Unity and African Union’s Complex Record.” Journal of African Union Studies 2, no. 1/2 (2013): 25–42. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26893804.
- East African Community. “Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere – Biography.” https://www.eac.int/about-ncpr/julius-nyerere-biography. [cover image source]
- Johnson, Martha C., and Meg Smaker. “State Building in De Facto States: Somaliland and Puntland Compared.” Africa Today 60, no. 4 (2014): 3–23. https://doi.org/10.2979/africatoday.60.4.3.
- Nursey-Bray, P. F. “Tanzania: The Development Debate.” African Affairs 79, no. 314 (1980): 55–78. http://www.jstor.org/stable/721632.
- Nyerere, Julius K. “A United States of Africa.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 1, no. 1 (1963): 1–6. http://www.jstor.org/stable/158780.
- Nyerere, Julius. “One Party Government.” Transition, no. 2 (1961): 9–11. https://doi.org/10.2307/2934255.
- NYERERE, JULIUS K. “The Arusha Declaration Ten Years After.” The African Review: A Journal of African Politics, Development and International Affairs 7, no. 2 (1977): 1–34. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45341443.
- Nyerere, J. K. “The Transition Profile: Julius Nyerere.” Transition, no. 2 (1961): 21–30. https://doi.org/10.2307/2934262.
- Stren, Richard E. Review of Ujamaa Vijijini and Bureaucracy in Tanzania, by Jannik Boesen, Birgit Störgard Madsen, Tony Moody, and Michaela von Freyhold. Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines 15, no. 3 (1981): 591–98. https://doi.org/10.2307/484742.
- T.G. 2017. “Why Somaliland Is East Africa’s Strongest Democracy.” The Economist. November 13, 2017. https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2017/11/13/why-somaliland-is-east-africas-strongest-democracy.
Citation details:
Author: Jabic Feser
Page Title: African Democracy Must be Custom-Made: Self-Determination and Democratic Systems in Tanzania and Somaliland
Site Name: Jabic -
Link: https://balkavanians.com/african-democracy-must-be-custom-made-self-determination-and-democratic-systems-in-tanzania-and-somaliland/
Date Published (DMY): 26/03/2025
Last Updated (DMY): 26/03/2025